

Penetrating Computer Systems & Networks

CSH6 Chapter 15

“Penetrating Computer Systems & Networks”

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Topics

CSH6 Chapter 15
“Penetrating Computer Systems and Networks”



- Multiple Factors in System Penetration
- Nontechnical Penetration Techniques
- Technical Penetration Techniques
- Political and Legal Issues



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Multiple Factors in System Penetration



- System security is much more than technical safeguards
- Human behavior key weakness in all systems
 - ❑ Social engineering attacks exploit normal human / social expectations
- Organizational culture critically important
 - ❑ Clear explanations of reasons behind policies support security rules
 - ❑ Reward – not only punishment – helpful
 - ❑ Consistent monitoring and enforcement required for effectiveness and legal protection
- Technical safeguards must constantly evolve and adapt to changing threats

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Nontechnical Penetration (1): Social Engineering



- Lying
- Impersonation
- Intimidation
- Subversion
- Bribery
- Seduction
- Extortion
- Blackmail
- Insiders
- Wide range of human targets



See CSH6 Chapter 19
Social Engineering & Low-Tech Attacks


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Nontechnical Penetration (2): Incremental Information Leveraging



- Collecting information from wide range of sources
- Potentially long time for collection
- Piecing together aggregated valuable information; e.g., internal jargon
- Making inferences about security implications
- Applying information for penetration
- E.g., Mitnick used internal bits and pieces to build personae for impersonation in social engineering




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Technical Penetration Techniques



- Data Leakage
- Intercepting Communications
- Breaching Access Controls
- Spying
- Penetration Testing, Toolkits & Techniques
- Basic Exploits
- Penetration via Web Sites
- Role of Malware and Botnets



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Data Leakage

- Definition:
 - ❑ Imperceptible transfer of data without authorization
 - ❑ Concealed, hard-to-detect copying or transmission of confidential data using *covert channels*
 - ❑ Alternative channels can be entirely independent of normal system (e.g., photography, human memory)
 - ❑ Impossible to stop transfer of information from secure to non-secure region
 - ❑ E.g., encrypted messaging, steganography
- Data loss from lost / stolen unencrypted portable devices
- Copying to portable devices (laptops, USB flash drives, CDs, DVDs, iPods....)



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Intercepting Communications

- Transmission Media
- Protocols
- Applications



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Transmission Media

- Asynchronous links
- Microwave
- Leased lines
- Fiber optics
- Satellites
- Emanations



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Asynchronous Links

- Easy to tap
 - ❑ Twisted-pair accessible via alligator clips, splices
 - ❑ Most cabling clearly labeled, identifiable
 - ❑ Wiring closets, patch panels unlocked
- Defenses
 - ❑ Shielded cables
 - ❑ Locked cabinets
 - ❑ Encryption of data stream



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Microwave

- Predominant method for long-distance phone lines
 - ❑ 2/3 phone calls
 - ❑ Line-of-sight: towers spaced every 25 miles
 - ❑ Vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks (topple towers)
- Footprint expands over distance
 - ❑ Can intercept data, decode using standard equipment
 - ❑ But volume of high-bandwidth lines makes specific taps difficult
- Encryption the only protective mechanism



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Leased Lines

- Phone lines normally switched
- Can fix circuit in place, improve quality
- Used for critical, high-volume data communications
- Increased vulnerability to tapping
- Beware *off-premises extension*
 - ❑ Easy to order extension without authorization
 - ❑ Use phone services of victim without paying
 - ❑ Check your phone bills for unauthorized extensions



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Fiber Optics

- High bandwidth
 - ❑ Hard to make sense of enormous data flows
- Expensive to tap
 - ❑ But folding denuded cable allows part of light to be captured without breaking cable
 - ❑ For high-security applications, use armored cable
- Identify breaks, taps using time-domain reflectometry
 - ❑ Light travels $0.3\text{m}/\mu\text{sec}$
 - ❑ Measure time to reflect from break, interference




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Satellites

- Geosynchronous satellites appear to hover over specific spot
- Can tap into uplink, override broadcast data
- Can tap downlink
 - ❑ 50 mile diameter footprint
 - ❑ Ordinary electronic gear
 - ❑ But volume considerations make tapping difficult to use
- Encryption is only defense




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Emanations

- Electronic equipment radiates *carrier waves*
- Operations of CPU, display, keyboard, modems *modulate the carrier*
- Can *demodulate* captured emanations
 - ❑ Demonstration using shortwave radio
 - ❑ Tuned to 25m band (~12.4MHz)
- Van Eck Freaking
 - ❑ Reconstituting appearance of VDT
 - ❑ Said to use \$200 worth of simple electronic parts
- TEMPEST US DoD standard for minimizing emanations
 - ❑ Hardware (x cost by 10)
 - ❑ Software (generates lots of noise)




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Protocols

- Packet-switching networks
- LANs
- Wireless LANs
- Spread-spectrum LANs




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Packet-Switching Networks

- Used in telephony, data communications
 - ❑ X.25 (Tymnet, Telenet, Datapac)
 - ❑ TCP/IP
- Generically called *datagram protocols*
 - ❑ Split messages into *packets*
 - ✓ Headers of packets include origin, destination, sequence number
 - ❑ Routers determine which path to use msec by msec
 - ✓ Result of local traffic on outbound potential routes for packet
- Interception possible but generally useless *except* at end-points
 - ❑ Huge volumes
 - ❑ Only some of the packets of any given message likely to be captured



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LANs

- Also datagram protocols – use packets
 - ❑ But architectures are generally rings, buses or stars – know where to look for data stream
- Coaxial or twisted-pair cabling
 - ❑ Easy to tap
 - ❑ LAN I/F card (aka NIC = Network Interface Card) generally captures *only* those packets directed at it
- Network monitors (aka *sniffers*) a major problem
 - ❑ Do not generally announce their presence on network
 - ❑ Software available to convert any NIC into *promiscuous mode*
 - ✓ Can see any packet, not just those directed at particular NIC
- Enable encryption as best defense

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Local Area Networks

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Wireless LANs

- All the vulnerabilities of wired LANs
- Plus emanations, eavesdropping
- Must configure mandatory encryption
- On related topics
 - ❑ Be careful not to use pagers as if they are secure: they aren't
 - ❑ Cellular phone calls are not secure
 - ❑ Even GSM (European cell phone standard) encryption cracked quickly


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Wireless LAN Security

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Spread-Spectrum LANs

- Use electrical system as wiring network
- Split data over many randomly-changed frequencies
- Extremely difficult to tap
- Beware unauthorized nodes
- Invented by actress Hedy Lamarr in 1940 & composer George Antheil




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Applications

- Toll fraud
- Voice mail
- E-mail
- Internet
- Intranet
- Extranet
- Firewalls
- Intrusion Detection




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Toll Fraud

- Severe problem for businesses
- Use CDAR (Call Detail Accounting Reporting) to stop internal fraud
- Thriving black market in telephone access codes
 - ✓ Some poor neighborhoods have had phone booths removed
 - ✓ Lines of people waiting to use stolen access codes for cheap overseas calls



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Toll Fraud (cont'd)

- Must train staff
 - ❑ PBX managers must disable DISA
 - ✓ Direct Inward Services Access
 - ✓ Allows access to long-distance, external lines
 - ❑ Protect PBXs with same security as mainframes, servers
 - ❑ Receptionists, secretaries, employees: Do not allow access to outside line by strangers



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Voice mail

- Easy target
 - ❑ Canonical passwords on voice-mailboxes
 - ❑ Former employees use old passwords
 - ❑ Sensitive information
- Attacks have included
 - ❑ Espionage
 - ❑ Sabotage




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E-mail

- Primary problem is concept of privacy
- Generally e-mail is difficult to intercept in transit
- Loss of control over published information
- Damage to organization's reputation
- Waste of time if uncontrolled




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Internet

- Most important communications component for most organizations today
 - ❑ Intranet: TCP/IP network for internal use
 - ❑ Extranet: TCP/IP network for clients or partners
- Highly vulnerable
 - ❑ IPv4 has no packet authentication – therefore spoofing easy
 - ❑ Many weaknesses in software




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Penetration Tools

- Almost all successful attacks exploit known vulnerabilities
 - ❑ Most vulnerabilities used have been known for years
- Port & vulnerability scanners
- Buffer overflow exploits very common
- War dialers used to be important to locate modem lines
- Brute-force password crackers useful if system allows access to password file for offline testing
- Rainbow tables store precalculated encrypted values for testing against password files




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Firewalls

- Key component of today's security architecture
- Devices that filter inbound and outbound packets
- Apply rules reflecting policy
- Useless to install firewall without policy – generally pass-through



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Gateway Security Devices

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Intrusion Detection

- No security perimeter should be expected to reach perfection
- Must be able to spot intrusions quickly
- Essential component of effective security
- Allows measured, planned response
 - ❑ Stop or monitor, collect evidence
 - ❑ Valuable in forensic work




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Breaching Access Controls

- Brute-force attacks
- Demon (war) dialing
- Exhaustive search
- Keyspace issues
- Login speed
- Scavenging RAM
- Scavenging swap & cache files
- Dictionary-based guessing
- Stealing
- Scavenging (including discarded media)




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Spying

- Laser interferometry (bouncing lasers off windows)
- Shoulder surfing
- War-driving
- Keyloggers
- Exploiting insecure public networks (e.g., hotels) – see Fig 15.2



CSH6 Figure 15.2
Poorly configured hotel room Internet connectivity

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Penetration Testing, Toolkits & Techniques

- System administrators and security experts commonly use vulnerability analysis and automated penetration tools to test system security
 - ❑ So do criminal hackers
- Scanners serve several functions
 - ❑ Laying out network architecture
 - ❑ Determining which protocols are in use
 - ❑ Mapping firewall rule sets
 - ❑ Determining which operating systems are in use



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Basic Exploits (1)

- Buffer Overflow
 - ❑ Most common exploit of poor coding
 - ❑ Insert data beyond expected end of input
 - ❑ Interpret extra data as instructions
- Password Cracking
 - ❑ Steal encrypted password file
 - ❑ Run crack program on other computer
 - ❑ Or try rainbow tables of predetermined passwords vs one-way encrypted codes




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Basic Exploits (2)

- Rootkits
 - ❑ Once system has been cracked, apply *rootkit*
 - ❑ Ensures that criminal can re-enter system at will
 - ❑ Installs a backdoor
 - ❑ Hides itself from discovery (invisible, wipes log records....)
- Trojan Code: often part of rootkits
- Back Doors: beware utilities that have been converted to Trojans with back doors



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Penetration via Web Sites

- Many Web sites are interactive: receive user input such as name, e-mail address etc.
- Attackers enter long or random inputs ("fuzzing") to see what happens
- Can cause buffer overflows and improper actions by Web server ("executing arbitrary code")
- Use of special characters in input strings (., /, \, metacharacters)
- Server-side includes – special commands interpreted by Web server – including exec for execution of code




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Web-Based Vulnerabilities

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Role of Malware and Botnets

- Viruses and worms may communicate confidential data to external Internet addresses
- Bots are malware that wait for instructions from controllers
- Botnets are collections of infected computers
- Botmasters can tell thousands of infected computers to launch attacks (especially DDoS)
- Google research suggests that 10% of all Web pages are infected with malware that can infect target computer upon viewing



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Political and Legal Issues

➤ Exchange of system penetration information

❑ Should such information be exchanged or not?

❑ InfraGard is specific organization with FBI vetting of members to facilitate information sharing



➤ Full disclosure

❑ How should vulnerability information be disclosed?

❑ Should it be sent to manufacturer only?

❑ Or posted in public to pressure / shame firms?

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**Now go and
study**

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